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When Children Die as a Result of Religious Practices
I. INTRODUCTION
When children die because of the religious practices of their parents, crimi-
nal liability generally follows. Newspapers recount these startling deaths with
disturbing frequency." States usually charge these parents with offenses under
child endangerment and criminal homicide statutes. The parents invariably as-
sert as a defense the freedom to exercise their religion guaranteed by the first
amendment of the United States Constitution.'
As is true for most issues of constitutional dimension, legislative and judi-
cial responses to the clash between personal freedom in the practice of religion
and governmental interest in the safety of children have evolved unevenly.3 This
Note presents an historical summary of the law in this area and examines the
efficacy of contemporary approaches. Statutory, constitutional, and policy issues
are discussed in the context of several recent cases.
4
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Most cases of children dying as a result of religious practices involve the
parents' failure to seek customary medical care.6 Findings of criminal culpabil-
ity, particularly those involving negligence, reflect community standards.7 The
dramatic changes in customary medical practice over the last one hundred and
fifty years could account for shifting judicial standards in defining negligence.
A. English Common and Statutory Law
Early English cases involving children harmed as a result of their parents'
religious practices show inconsistent outcomes under both common and statu-
tory law. Typical of an early case reflecting community standards of negligence
is Regina v. Wagstaffe,6 decided in 1868 under English common law. In Wag-
staffe, the parents of a fourteen-month-old girl attributed her coughing to teeth-
ing. In accordance with the teachings of their sect, The Peculiar People, the
parents applied oil to their daughter's chest and called in elders to pray for her.
1. See, e.g., Couple Guilty of Murder for Starving Son in Religious Fast, Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989,
at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1Ith D. Sept. 8, 1989).
2. US. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . ."); see infra note 99 and text accompanying notes 94 through 121.
3. See Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent Children: Manslaughter Liability of the Christian
Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 203, 205-12; see also Note, California's Prayer Healing Dilemma, 14 HAsriNGS
CoNsT. LQ. 395, 396-400.
4. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 11th D. Sept. 8, 1989);
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616
(1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
5. The term "customary" signifies that which is "commonly practiced, used, or observed." WEBSTER'S SEV-
ENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963).
6. Annotation, Homicide: Failure to Provide Medical or Surgical Attention, 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965).
7. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 3, at 208-10.
8. 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868).
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The daughter died from inflammation of both lungs, but the jury acquitted the
parents of negligence based upon the reasonableness of their belief in prayer. 9
Reportedly in response to Wagstaffe,'0 Parliament passed the Poor Law
Amendment Act of 1868 which included "medical aid" among the provisions a
parent must make for his child. Failure to make the required medical provisions
constituted the misdemeanor offense of "willful[] neglect.""1
Nevertheless, in Regina v. Hines," an English case decided in 1874, after
enactment of the Poor Law Amendment Act, the father of a two-year-old boy
who died of pneumonia was found not criminally negligent in choosing prayer
over current medical practices. Perhaps, as has been suggested by Trescher and
O'Neill, 3 the court simply ignored the Poor Law Amendment Act and applied
common law principles. When the trial judge directed the not guilty verdict,
however, he announced that there existed no "omission of duty" for giving a
child "nursing and care instead of calling in a doctor to apply blisters, leeches
and calomel .... 1,14 This judge apparently believed that prayer fell as much
within the definition of medical aid as the application of leeches.
Subsequent English cases show a movement away from the common law
"reasonableness under the circumstances" test toward a stricter application of
the statutory language. Regina v. Downes,"5 decided in 1875, exhibits a fact
pattern strikingly similar to the fact patterns in Wagstaffe and Hines. The fa-
ther of a two-year-old boy summoned an elder to pray for his son whom both
thought was teething. Manslaughter charges were filed when the child died of
lung inflammation and pleura. The judge in Downes directed a guilty verdict
based upon jury findings that (1) the child's father neglected to get medical aid
when it was reasonable to do so; (2) the child died because of that neglect; (3)
the father mistakenly believed medical aid was not needed; and (4) the father
truly believed it was wrong to call in medical aid.' 6 Thus, criminal culpability
was found despite the father's sincerely held belief in treatment through prayer,
the court's acknowledgement that the father had made a mistake, and the limits
of customary medical practice in 1875.
Regina v. Senior,'" decided in 1898, evidenced the same result as in
Downes under a replacement statute to the Poor Law Amendment Act. The
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act of 1894"" classified neglect of a child by
a parent or custodian as a misdemeanor. Unlike its precursor, however, this law
made no mention of medical aid; but as Lord Russell opined in Senior:
[i]t would be an odd result if we were obliged to come to the conclusion that, in
dealing with such a subject as the protection of children, the Legislature had meant to
9. Id. at 533-34.
10. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 3, at 207.
11. 31 & 32 Vict. ch. 122, § 37 (1868).
12. Noted in Regina v. Downes, 33 L.T.R. 675, 676 n.(a) (Sept. 1875-Feb. 1876).
13. Treseher & O'Neill, supra note 3, at 206.
14. 33 L.T.R. at 676 n.(a).
15. 1 L.R.-Q.B. 25 (1875).
16. Id. at 28-29.
17. 1 Q.B. 283 (1899).
18. 57 & 58 Vict. ch. 41, § 1 (1894).
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take . . . a retrograde step; . . . the provisions of the Act of 1894, shew [sic] an
increased anxiety . . . to provide for the protection of infants."
The court in Senior found that the father of an infant who had died of diarrhea
and pneumonia was guilty of willful neglect when he failed to seek medical
help. Because his father's neglect either caused or accelerated the child's death,
the court upheld the manslaughter conviction.
All of the families in the above-cited English cases belonged to a sect call-
ing themselves The Peculiar People, who believed that the use of medical care
evidenced a lack of faith in God. The children's deaths occurred within a period
of thirty years, and yet some parents were acquitted and others convicted of
criminal negligence and manslaughter because they followed the tenets of their
faith. Neither legislative intent, nor fact pattern, nor decision-making procedure
adequately accounts for the variance in these cases. The weight given to the
parents having acted in accord with religious beliefs is unclear. What is clear,
particularly from the appellate opinion in Senior, is that the English courts are
most likely to favor conviction when the parental neglect is defined in a statute
rather than by the common law. 20 American jurisprudence likewise relies heav-
ily upon statutorily-defined child neglect.
B. American Jurisprudence 1900-1990
Shortly after the turn of the century, a number of cases were decided in
various jurisdictions throughout the United States in which parents were
charged with criminal neglect and manslaughter because their children had
died following an illness for which traditional medical care was not sought. In
each of these cases, the parents introduced religious beliefs as a defense.' 1 Al-
though outcomes differed, the courts consistently rejected the first amendment
defense of free exercise of religion.
22
1. Early Cases: 1900-1960
Among the frequently cited cases are People v. Pierson,2 Bradley v.
State,2' and Craig v. State.25 In Pierson, the New York Court of Appeals found
prayer healing inconsistent with the state's interest in protecting the lives and
health of its children. Mr. Pierson was convicted of manslaughter after his child
died of pneumonia. However, in Bradley, the Florida Supreme Court reversed a
manslaughter conviction which was based on Mr. Bradley's failure to provide
medical care for his severely burned daughter. The court reasoned that the fail-
ure to provide medical attention was not contemplated by the manslaughter
statute and that Mr. Bradley's daughter may have died even with medical care.
19. 1 Q.B. at 290.
20. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 3, at 208.
21. See Id. at 208-12. See also Note, supra note 3, at 398-400; Comment, Religious Beliefs and the Crimi-
nal Justice System: Some Problems of the Faith Healer, 8 Loy. LA.L. REv. 396, 405-11 (1975).
22. Comment, supra note 21, at 408.
23. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
24. 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920).
25. 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
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Bradley's motive, his religious conviction, was held irrelevant.26 Likewise, in
Craig, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed involuntary manslaughter
charges against the parents of an infant who died of pneumonia. The court
found that had the Craigs called a physician when it was reasonable to do so,
the medicine would have been ineffective to save their child. With respect to the
religious defense, however, the Craig court stated that "[w]hile a person's free-
dom to believe is absolute, his freedom to act is not."27
These early cases typify the ambivalence of the judicial system toward per-
sons whose sincerely-held religious beliefs harm their children. The inconsistent
results reflect a tension between a desire to vindicate the child's needless death
through conviction and a desire to acknowledge the parent's good intentions
through acquittal.
2. Modern Cases: 1960-1990
Despite the historical lack of success of the religious defense, the defense is
consistently asserted in cases involving children who die from lack of medical
care. One commentator has noted that a large proportion of convictions in these
cases were reversed on appeal, often for reasons unrelated to the charge, and
suggests that perhaps this reflects sympathy for the dilemma of parents whose
faith dictates unlawful conduct.2 8 In 1960, Trescher and O'Neill went so far as
to predict that growing legislative, judicial, and social acceptance of healing
through prayer would ultimately eliminate criminal prosecution in the event
that the healing did not work."'
In contrast to this prediction, cases of the 1980s involving harm to children
as a result of religious practices show an increasing trend toward serious crimi-
nal prosecution. Four cases illustrate this trend: (1) in Commonwealth v. Barn-
hart,3° the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld involuntary manslaughter
convictions of parents whose infant son died of cancer because their religious
beliefs precluded seeking medical treatment; (2) in Hall v. State,31 the Supreme
Court of Indiana upheld the reckless homicide conviction of parents whose son
died of pneumonia following treatment by spiritual means; (3) in Walker v.
Superior Court,3 2 California upheld the involuntary manslaughter conviction of
a mother whose daughter died from acute meningitis following treatment by
prayer alone; and (4) in the unreported case of Cottam,33 recently decided in
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, parents were convicted of third-degree murder in
the death of their fourteen-year-old son following a religiously motivated fast.34
These cases are examined below to highlight statutory and constitutional issues.
26. 79 Fla. at 655, 84 So. at 679.
27. 220 Md. at 599, 155 A.2d at 690.
28. Comment, supra note 21, at 408.
29. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 3, at 217.
30. 345 Pa. Super. at 36, 497 A.2d at 630.
31. 493 N.E.2d at 436.
32. 47 Cal. 3d at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
33. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 11th D. Sept. 8, 1989).
34. Id.
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III. THE STATUTORY ISSUES
A. The Act or Omission Distinction
Criminal conduct requires the commission of a voluntary act.35 Without
this stipulation, one could conceivably be found criminally liable for acts com-
mitted while unconscious"8 or for thoughts which never materialize into ac-
tion. 7 When failure to act causes harm, criminal liability may or may not fol-
low; the determinative factor is the existence of a legal duty to act.38 This duty
can arise from a relationship creating the duty, the most obvious being that of
parent and child.3 9
1. Determining "Legal Duty" of Others
When no legal or statutory relationship exists, courts have struggled with
the analysis required to determine culpability for harmful acts of omission. In
Jones v. U.S.,40 decided in 1962, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a
manslaughter conviction because the accused had no legal duty to care for the
deceased. The defendant had permitted the infant son of a family friend to live
in her home. The child died of malnutrition, although the defendant had the
means to provide sustenance. The court found that the defendant had no duty to
care for the child through statute, contract, or direct relationship.4 '
Fifty-five years earlier, in People v. Beardsley,42 a Michigan court reached
the same result using the same reasoning. In Beardsley, the accused failed to
obtain medical help for a weekend guest in his home whom he knew had swal-
lowed a lethal dose of morphine. Mr. Beardsley's conviction was overturned be-
cause he had no legal duty toward his guest.
Compare Jones and Beardsley to the English court's announcement in
1893 that the moral obligation of a woman who lived in her invalid aunt's home
to provide her aunt with food constituted a legal duty.43 When courts have no
statutorily defined duty on which to rely, and define the harmful act as omis-
sive, results are inconsistent and unjust.
2. Codification of the Parental "Legal Duty to Act"
In England, the Poor Law Amendment Act 4 and the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children Act" demonstrated early codification of the parents' legal duties. In
35. S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER. CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 188-98 (1989).
36. See, e.g., People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970) (evidence of involuntary
unconsciousness is a complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide).
37. S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 197.
38. Leavens, Criminal Omissions, 76 CAuF. L. Rav. 547, 552-57 (1988).
39. Id. at 557.
40. 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41. Sea S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 207-08.
42. 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
43. Regina v. Instan, 1 Q.B. 450 (1893).
44. 31 & 32 Vict. ch. 122, § 37 (1868).
45. 57 & 58 Vict. ch. 41 (1894).
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this country, child endangerment statutes serve the same purpose: they invaria-
bly require provision of food, shelter and medical care, and violation of these
statutes can result in the imposition of criminal penalties. 46 The purpose of child
endangerment statutes is to prevent the financial dependency of children upon
the state. This is why courts consistently examine the parent's financial ability
to provide for his child's needs in determining willfulness of neglect.47
Child endangerment statutes defining legal duty play an important role
when parents are prosecuted for manslaughter or murder following the death of
a child due to lack of food or medical care. Because the parent's conduct has
been omissive, criminal liability depends upon the existence of a legal duty. The
child endangerment statutes provide the basis for this legal duty. The violation
of the endangerment statute provides the unlawful act required in the homicide
statute.
The four cases mentioned earlier, Barnhart,48 Hall,4 Walker" and Cot-
tam,51 took place in Pennsylvania, Indiana and California. The child endanger-
ment statutes of these states are typical of most child endangerment statutes in
that they exempt from the provision of medical care those whose religious be-
liefs call for treatment by prayer.52 Each of the accused in Barnhart, Hall,
Walker, and Cottam were charged with manslaughter or murder under the
homicide statutes, and with neglect under the endangerment statutes of their
respective states. Consequently, each parent argued that he was exempt from
prosecution under both the homicide and endangerment statutes because his
conduct was not proscribed due to the exemption in the endangerment stat-
utes.53 All three courts rejected this argument on the basis that the exemption
appeared only in the endangerment statutes and not in the homicide statutes
under which each of the defendants was separately charged. 4
3. Results of the Omission Analysis
The omission analysis, which relies upon the legal duty to act, evolved from
the distinction made between the harmful act and the harmful omission. One
commentator suggested that courts should abandon this traditional approach
and should examine instead the causal connection between the actor's conduct,
be it act or omission, and the harm proscribed.55 This approach would remove
the focus upon legal duty and relationships. The application of child endanger-
46. See Note, supra note 3, at 398.
47. Annotation, Homicide by Withholding Food, Clothing, or Shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207 § 2(a) (1975).
48. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
49. 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986).
50. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
51. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, l1th D. Sept. 8. 1989).
52. Note, supra note 3, at 398 & n.32.
53. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. at 17-19, 497 A.2d at 620-21 (18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 4304 challenged as vague;
"duty of care" not defined); Hall, 493 N.E.2d at 435; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 120-38, 763 P.2d at 856-69, 253 Cal.
Rptr. at 5-18.
54. 345 Pa. Super. at 35-36, 497 A.2d at 630; 493 N.E.2d at 436; 47 Cal. 3d at 143-44, 763 P.2d at 873, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 22.
55. Leavens, supra note 38, at 590-91. The omission analysis has proven to be particularly troublesome in
cases of withdrawal of medical treatment from comatose patients. Id. at 584-87.
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ment statutes in cases involving deaths of children would be unnecessary to
show legal duty or unlawful act. Because the exemptions for those who believe
in faith healing appear only in the endangerment statutes, there would be no
question of exemptions. There would simply be a question as to whether or not
the child's death resulted from lack of food or lack of customary medical care.
The parents would be charged under the homicide statutes alone.
Examination of the policies underlying the child neglect and homicide stat-
utes highlights the merits of this suggested approach. Child neglect statutes
were designed to prevent dependency of children upon the state. Homicide stat-
utes were designed to deter, or seek retribution for, unacceptable conduct which
society has deemed deserving of criminal sanction. When a parent causes his
child to die, the latter policy is clearly relevant.
B. Level of Culpability
1. Application of Level of Culpability Standards
In the four recent cases being examined, Barnhart,5" Hall,5' 7 Walker 8 and
Cottam,5 9 the requisite mens rea ° for each conviction was recklessness, or gross
negligence. To sustain a conviction with a mens rea of recklessness, the state
must prove that the accused was aware of the risk of harm and consciously
disregarded the risk of harm. The defendants in Barnhart,6 Hall2 and
Walker 3 all argued that the requisite level of culpability could not be proven.
Each of their arguments was grounded upon the faith healing exemption in the
applicable child endangerment statute.
a. Barnhart
The Barnharts were convicted of involuntary manslaughter, defined as "the
doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing
of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner (where the actor)
causes the death of another person."64 The unlawful act committed was child
endangering which, under Pennsylvania law, requires that the welfare of the
child be "knowingly" endangered:6 5 a "person acts knowingly . . . when [with
respect to his conduct] he is aware that his conduct is of that nature . . . and
[with respect to the result of his conduct] he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result." 6 On appeal the Barnharts
claimed that the jury should have been instructed that, if the defendants were
56. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
57. 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986).
58. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
59. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 11th D. Sept. 8, 1989).
60. Mens rea means criminal intent. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
61. 345 Pa. Super. at 31-32, 497 A.2d at 627.
62. 493 N.E.2d at 435.
63. 47 Cal. 3d at 134-35, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
64. 345 Pa. Super. at 35. 497 A.2d at 629-30 (quoting from 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504).
65. Id. at 36 n.13, 497 A.2d at 630 n.13.
66. Id. at 31 & n.1l, 497 A.2d at 627 & n.1l.
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acting under the mistaken belief that their prayers would heal their son, this
belief would negate the mental element of awareness because the defendants
would not have been aware of the risk of their conduct.67 The appellate court
rejected this argument because the defendants had not claimed at trial that
they relied on prayer out of mistake or ignorance.68
Some authority does exist for the proposition that one who believes in the
power of his faith might not, in fact, be aware of the risk inherent in his con-
duct and, therefore, the defense of lack of requisite intent could succeed. 69 How-
ever, in this age of advanced medical technology, it is difficult to argue after a
child has died that the risk of not seeking medical care, or of not eating for
extended periods, is either a justifiable or an insubstantial risk. A child's death
obviates the argument. Nevertheless, the defendants in Barnhart assumed the
position that their choice to follow their religious teachings left them no choice
of treatment. In his charge to the jury, the trial judge in Barnhart answered the
parents' claim that they followed a religious . law: "to permit any man to set up
an alleged religious or conscientious belief to override the laws of the land
would be to create an ecclesiastical authority which human experience has
demonstrated to be the most oppressive tyranny under which mankind has ever
groaned." 70 Why, then, allow parents to fail to provide medical care for a sick
child under any circumstances?
b. Hall
In Hall v. State, the Halls were convicted under Indiana's reckless homi-
cide71 and child neglect7 2 statutes. Indiana defines reckless conduct as that
which occurs in "plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that
might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct. a7 3 Indiana's child neglect statute exempts from criminal
liability a caretaker who "in the legitimate practice of his religious belief, pro-
vided treatment by spiritual means through prayer, in lieu of medical care, to
his dependent. 17 4 The Halls argued that the exemption in the child neglect stat-
ute for those choosing prayer in lieu of medical care brought their "reckless"
conduct within the realm of acceptable standards. 75
The court, in a remarkably unsatisfactory resolution, found that the Indi-
ana legislature had distinguished bodily injury neglect from fatal neglect. Neg-
lect resulting in serious bodily injury to a child is governed by the neglect stat-
67. Id. at 31-32, 497 A.2d at 628.
68. Id.
69. People v. Strong, 37 N.Y.2d 568, 338 N.E.2d 602, 376 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975) (manslaughter conviction
reversed because jury could have found defendant did not perceive risk involved when he stabbed victim repeat-
edly during ritualistic ceremony).
70. 345 Pa. Super. at 29-30 n.10, 497 A.2d at 626-27 n.10.
71. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-5 (1985).
72. IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4 (1985).
73. 493 N.E.2d at 435 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2 (1985)).
74. Id. at 435 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4 (1985)).
75. Id. at 435.
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ute; neglect resulting in a child's death is governed by the homicide statute.76
Under the homicide statute, which has no prayer exemption, the Halls' argu-
ment failed. The Supreme Court of Indiana thus upheld the reckless homicide
conviction but not the child neglect conviction because of the doctrine of double
jeopardy. The pattern of child neglect formed the basis of the reckless homicide;
the Halls could not be convicted of both the offense and the instrumentality of
the offense.7
c. Walker
In Walker v. Superior Court,7 8 Ms. Walker also argued that she did not
possess the degree of culpability necessary to be convicted for involuntary man-
slaughter and felony child endangerment.7 In California, criminal negligence is
the degree of culpability which must be proven under either statute. Criminal
negligence means "aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless [conduct that] ...
must be such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible
with a proper regard for human life . . "8o Ms. Walker cited the old English
cases described above in support of her argument that she believed in prayer
and so was unaware of the risk to her daughter. She argued further that since
California's misdemeanor child neglect statute allows prayer in lieu of medical
care, her conduct did not constitute a deviation from acceptable behavior. A
finding of gross negligence, the defendant argued, would be incompatible with
the legislative intent behind the exemption for faith healers.$'
The Supreme Court of California rejected Ms. Walker's claims that her
defense was established by English common law and her sincerity and good
faith in treating her daughter with prayer.8" California employs an objective
test of reasonableness, and the fact finder determined that a reasonable person
would have been aware of the risk and would have sought medical care for
someone in her daughter's condition. Thus, the court presumed that Ms. Walker
had that awareness. The court noted, however, that Ms. Walker's sincerity ar-
gument could succeed in a jurisdiction using a subjective test of criminal negli-
gence where the question of awareness would turn on what was in her own
mind. As to legislative intent, the court found that California merely accommo-
dates religious practices when children are threatened with no serious harm.83
d. Cottam
In a Pennsylvania trial court, Mr. and Ms. Cottam were convicted of third
degree murder in the death of their fourteen-year-old son following an extended
76. Id.
77. Id. at 436.
78. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
79. Id. at 134-39, 763 P.2d at 866-69, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15-18.
80. Id. at 136, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
81. Id. at 136, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
82. Id. at 135-36, 763 P.2d at 867-68, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
83. Id. at 137 n.17, 763 P.2d at 868 n.17, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17 n.17.
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family fast.84 In Pennsylvania, a third degree murder charge lacks specific in-
tent to kill but requires malice. "Malice in context of third-degree murder may
be found if defendant consciously disregards an unjustified and extremely high
risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm."85 When Eric
Cottam died, he had not eaten for six weeks. The family's savings of $3,775.00
were set aside for their church, and they believed that God would rescue
them.88 This is the first starvation case in Pennsylvania to "rise[] above involun-
tary manslaughter."87 The Cottams are expected to appeal their convictions.88
Perhaps Cottam signals the reversal of the trend toward societal and judicial
acceptance of harmful religious practices noted by Trescher and O'Neill thirty
years ago.
2. Results of Judicial Application of Culpability
In both Barnhart89 and Hall,90 the courts based the manslaughter convic-
tions on "unlawful" acts as defined in the child endangerment statutes. This
interdependence of statutes is quite common. A substantial number of jurisdic-
tions have statutory schemes which include the misdemeanor-manslaughter
rule."' Simply put, the manslaughter charge is contingent upon the commission
of an unlawful act, usually a misdemeanor offense. Like the felony-murder rule,
it "dispenses with proof of culpability and imposes liability for a serious crime
without reference to the actor's state of mind." 92
Aside from this general criticism that the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule
ignores the mens rea with respect to death, in prayer healing cases the use of
child endangerment statutes as a basis for the manslaughter charge is problem-
atic because of the exemptions for prayer healers. The Model Penal Code classi-
fication of offenses requires, for manslaughter, a finding of recklessness, and for
murder, a finding of recklessness with an extreme disregard for the value of
human life.9a This scheme would operate without reference to the neglect stat-
utes which are liable to include exemptions. Using the murder statute rather
than the manslaughter statute, as Pennsylvania did recently in the Cottam case,
also dispenses with the necessity of filing separate charges under the child en-
dangerment statutes.
84. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 11th D. Sept. 8, 1989).
85. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1989).
86. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, l1th D. Sept. 8, 1989).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
90. 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986).
91. A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, 75-77 & nn.91-94 (1980).
92. Id. at 77.
93. Id. at § 210.3 & § 210.2.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Limits on the Free Exercise Clause
The first amendment of the United States Constitution declares that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."94 The Supreme Court held in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut 95 that this proscription extends to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 96 In this same opinion, the Court reiterated its
announcement from Reynolds v. United States97 that whereas the freedom to
believe is absolute, the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection
of society.98
This dichotomy of believing and acting with respect to one's religion has
been the subject of much scholarly debate.99 Some twenty years after Cantwell,
the Court recognized in Braunfeld v. Brown 00 that government regulations can
place an indirect burden upon religious activity and must do so only when its
secular purpose cannot otherwise be achieved. Two years after Braunfeld, the
Court upheld a free exercise challenge to South Carolina's unemployment law
in Sherbert v. Verner.'0 ' The Court reasoned that exempting a Seventh Day
Adventist from the Saturday work requirement would not threaten the viability
of the state's unemployment program. Braunfeld and Sherbert ushered in a
"rights-protective review standard in free exercise cases." 102
In another line of cases independent of the free exercise clause, the Su-
preme Court found that parents have the right to make decisions about their
children's education without undue interference by the government. In Meyer v.
Nebraska,03 the Court invalidated a state statute prohibiting the study of for-
eign languages prior to the eighth grade. Two years later, the Court announced
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters'04 that parents may choose to send their children
to schools run by religious organizations rather than to public schools. Both
cases were decided on the basis of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.
Nonetheless, as with most issues of constitutional dimension, competing in-
terests must be weighed in the balance. The safety and well-being of children is
94. US. CONST. amend. I.
95. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
96. Id. at 303.
97. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
98. 310 U.S. at 303-04.
99. See, e.g., Choper, The Free Exercise Clause; A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Devel-
opments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943, 943-46 (1986). See generally Lupu, Where Rights Begir The Problem
of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989); Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarification of the Religious Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233 (1989); Kamenshine, Developments in the
Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1606 (1987).
100. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
101. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
102. Lupu, supra note 99, at 940.
103. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
104. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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one of the most compelling interests that a government can assert."0 5 Prince v.
Massachusetts'"8 stands for the proposition that the state possesses broad au-
thority over the child while that of the family is not without limits. In Prince, a
guardian was found to have violated a law prohibiting children from selling
materials in public places when she allowed the child to help her distribute
publications of her religious denomination on the street. "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves," the Court stated, "[b]ut it does not follow they
are free. . to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age
.. . when they can make that choice for themselves.'1 07
In its role of parens patriae, however, the state must be vigilant against
interfering with fundamental personal freedoms and rights of the family. One
fundamental right is the interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their
children. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,108 the Court found that the Amish choice to
discontinue formal education following the eighth grade outweighed the state's
interest in universal education until age sixteen. 109
Against this judicial backdrop, parents whose religious practices ultimately
harm their children assert a complete defense under the first amendment's free
exercise clause. Case law in the state courts shows an overwhelming consensus
that the safety, health, and well-being of children outweigh the parents' rights
of free exercise when the latter clearly threatens the former."10 Barnhart,"",
Walker"" and Cottamrn" 3 are no exception.
The Barnhart court recognized that its decision penalized the parents in
the practice of their religion and emphasized that the liability stemmed from
their having sacrificed their child's life, citing Prince as authority.," Using the
same rationale, the Walker court found that parents "have no right to free exer-
cise of religion at the price of a child's life, regardless of the prohibitive or
compulsive nature of the governmental infringement."' 5 The court further con-
cluded that criminal prosecution represented the least restrictive alternative
available to the state that was still adequately effective."'
In their Pennsylvania trial, the Cottams raised an issue that Justice Doug-
las discussed in his partial dissent to Yoder: 7 children have constitutional
rights. Justice Douglas believed that the Amish teenagers involved in the Wis-
consin compulsory education dispute had the right to choose for themselves; yet
the majority in Yoder dismissed the issue because the children were not legally
105. See Note, The Outer Limits of Parental Autonomy: Withholding Medical Treatment from Children,
Omo ST. LJ. 813, 815-17 (1981).
106. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
107. id. at 170.
108. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
109. Id. at 236.
110. For an excellent collection of cases, see Comment, supra note 21, at 405 n.41 & 407 n.48.
111. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
112. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
113. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 11th D. Sept. 8, 1989).
114. 345 Pa. Super. at 26, 497 A.2d at 624.
115. 47 Cal. 3d at 140, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
116. Id. at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
117. 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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adults.118 Similarly, the Pennsylvania court did not permit the Cottams to argue
their children's first amendment rights to free exercise because the children
were in their parents' care. 19 It is not clear whether the Cottam court consid-
ered the children unemancipated and therefore subject to parental direction or
so strongly influenced by their parents that they were unable to form their own
ideas.
The Supreme Court has not availed itself of the opportunity to rule on the
right to free exercise in the situation where a child has died because of parental
religious practices. Nor does the Court seem so inclined at this point since the
Court has denied certiorari in both Barnhart20 and Walker. 21 The consistency
of the findings in the state courts could explain the Court's disinclination to
grant certiorari. Despite the consistent findings among the state courts on this
constitutional argument, however, defendants invariably raise constitutional de-
fenses. The related due process argument analyzed below could explain the con-
tinued reliance upon the constitutional defenses.
B. The Due Process Argument
Constructive notice is an established principle in criminal law. Laws must
be readily comprehensible to the ordinary person so that he may know when his
conduct constitutes an offense.' 22 Ordinary persons do not typically read laws,
but the publication of the laws serves as constructive notice to everyone. Thus,
the deterrence goal of the criminal law is served. 2
The notion that fair warning must be given, through either constructive or
actual notice, as to what behavior carries criminal sanction is the basis for the
vagueness doctrine. 24 Vague laws violate due process rights by chilling the ex-
ercise of protected freedoms, permitting arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-
ment of the laws, and impairing the effectiveness of the judicial process.' 25 Judi-
cial interpretation can sometimes correct a vague statute, but must not create
an unforeseen extension of the law. 28
When a prosecution occurs without notice, the defendant can argue that he
is deprived of property or liberty without due process of law. Parents charged
with criminal offenses following the death of a child through the practice of
religious beliefs have made such lack of notice claims. 17 The basis for this as-
sertion lies in the fact that child neglect or endangerment statutes include ex-
emptions for faith healing in lieu of medical care. How can the government, so
118. Id. at 230-31.
119. Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2A, col. 3 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 11th D. Sept. 8, 1989).
120. 345 Pa. Super 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
121. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
122. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
123. See id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
124. Todd, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military, Prison, and Campus Con-
texts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 857-60 (1974).
125. Id.
126. Boule v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1964).
127. See, e.g., State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (1984).
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the argument goes, permit faith healing under one law and criminally prosecute
under another law when the faith healing fails?
In State v. Miskimens,3 8 an Ohio Court of Common Pleas outlined rea-
sons why the religious exemption in the Ohio child endangering statute is un-
constitutional. Mr. and Mrs. Miskimens were indicted on child endangering and
involuntary manslaughter charges after their infant son died of a bacterial in-
fection following treatment by prayer.129 Ohio Revised Code § 2919.22(A)
reads in part, "[i]t is not violative of a duty of care . . . under this division
when the parent . . . of a child treats the physical or mental illness or defect of
the child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in accordance with the tenets
of a recognized religious body."'' 0 The Miskimens court found that this sen-
tence in the statute (1) violates the establishment clause of the first amendment
by showing a preference for one religion over another and entangling the state
in a determination of what constitutes "spiritual means" and "recognized reli-
gious body;" (2) unjustifiably permits parents to endanger the lives of their chil-
dren in the exercise of religious beliefs; and (3) violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment by creating a group of parents with special
exemptions and, more importantly, a group of children without the same protec-
tion as most.'' The court announced a prospective invalidation of that sentence
in Ohio's child endangerment statute.
The Miskimens court went on to dismiss the charges of endangering chil-
dren and involuntary manslaughter against the defendants because the statute
as applied was unconstitutionally vague: 32 "[i]t is now apparent that the stat-
ute fails to provide fair notice as to what contemplated conduct is forbidden,
and fails to set reasonably clear guidelines for those charged with its
administration."' 33
As the Miskimens did in Ohio, the defendant in Walker attacked the Cali-
fornia statutes as unconstitutionally vague. Walker argued that California's
child endangerment and felony statutes, when read together, create uncertainty
about proscribed conduct; do not articulate a standard of conduct; and fail to
provide fair notice that criminal liability can arise from practicing faith healing
that does not work. 34 The court responded that uncertainty on the part of law
enforcement officials is resolved by prosecutorial discretion and, read separately,
the statutes do articulate standards; the court also stated that a law may not be
void for vagueness when reasonable construction can be given to its language.'35
It is interesting to note that, in his concurring opinion in Walker, Justice
Mosk found, as did the Ohio court in Miskimens, that the religious exemption
in the child endangerment statute violated the establishment clauses of the
128. Id.
129. Id. at 49, 490 N.E.2d at 936.
130. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1988).
131. 22 Ohio Misc. at 44-47, 490 N.E.2d at 935-36.
132. Id. at 47-49, 490 N.E.2d at 936-38.
133. Id. at 48, 490 N.E.2d at 938.
134. 47 Cal. 3d at 141-43, 763 P.2d at 871-72, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
135. Id. at 143, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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United States and California Constitutions.' " One commentator examining
California's conundrum has suggested that California revise its child endanger-
ment statute to specify that medical care shall be provided whenever permanent
harm could otherwise result. 137
In Commonwealth v. Barnhart,138 the defendants also presented a constitu-
tional due process argument; they claimed lack of notice that faith healing
could result in criminal liability. However, their no notice claim was dismissed
on the facts of the case. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that the
Barnharts clearly knew that their son was in grave danger and so were on notice
of his imminent death. 3 9 They were charged with consciously disregarding a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result. The court explained
that not every behavior tending to bring about a proscribed result need be speci-
fied in a statute." 0
It is clear that courts are not always persuaded by the no notice claim. But
Miskimens should serve as notice to lawmakers that the anomaly of faith heal-
ing exemptions in child endangerment statutes can relieve from criminal sanc-
tion parents whose children have died as a result of their parents' religious prac-
tices. By the same token, the lives of some children might be saved through the
elimination of such exemptions.
V. THE POLICY ISSUES
A. The State's Objectives
How does one's view of the criminal law affect the outcome of these cases?
The major purposes of the criminal law are deterrence and retribution."' Most
criminal sanctions are imposed today because the state has an interest in
preventing or deterring particular conduct. Certainly the state wants to prevent
the death of children whenever possible. The current trend toward prosecution
of parents whose children are harmed as a result of religious practices is consis-
tent with this goal if we believe that the threat of prosecution deters parental
religious practices which threaten their children's lives.
On the other hand, do most people feel retributive toward a parent whose
child died through that parent's actions or failure to act? While people gener-
ally feel sympathy toward a bereaved parent, outrage at the futility of the
child's death would likely outweigh any sympathy. Since both the deterrent and
retributive goals of criminal justice are served by prosecution in these cases,
why are exemptions placed in the neglect statutes? At what point does a parent
administering prayer to his sick child turn from a (non-negligent) faith healer
into a criminal? According to the courts, a parent becomes a criminal when the
child dies.
136. Id. at 144-51, 763 P.2d at 873-78, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 22-27 (Mosk, J., concurring).
137. Note, supra note 3, at 417.
138. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
139. Id. at 19, 497 A.2d at 621.
140. Id. at 19 n.4, 497 A.2d at 621 n.4.
141. See generally S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 113-65.
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B. The Parents' Interests
Parents share their interest in personal freedoms with the rest of the popu-
lation. In addition, parents have an interest in being allowed to use their discre-
tion to guide their children and in being allowed the freedom to pass on their
values and beliefs to their children. This holds true regardless of the nature of
those values and beliefs.
States have historically given wide berth to the parent-child relationship in
recognition of the parents' superior understanding of their children's needs. 142
Modern child abuse and neglect statutes reflect the values of parental autonomy
and family independence, but, at the same time, purport to protect the child. If
placing children at risk constitutes neglect, how can legislatures sanction ex-
emptions for parents who refuse medical care for their sick children?
When laws codify religious exemptions and courts interpret and apply
these exemptions, the opportunity for bias emerges. Discrimination can be de-
tected in our laws among those whose faith is shared by many and those whose
beliefs are new or whose numbers are few.'4" Parents want their children pro-
tected by the same freedoms they enjoy. Religious freedom is jeopardized when
some groups are extended privileges by the state in what may well be a direct
contravention of the establishment clause of the first amendment.
C. The Community's Interest
Because most people live in urban or semi-urban areas in the United
States, families are not typically isolated. Children are exposed to a myriad of
ideas and cultural influences outside their families. Parents must engage them-
selves with their children in the community in order to protect their interests.
Community includes all of the places where people spend time working, learn-
ing, worshipping, exercising, shopping, relaxing, and talking. It is in many of
these places that children who are at risk can be found long before the state
would know or have reason to act. Recognition of child abuse and neglect has
long been a concern in schools and day care centers. Awareness efforts must be
expanded so that all segments of the community can assist with recognition and
action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the uneven but certain movement toward the prosecution of par-
ents whose children die as a result of religious practices, parents consistently
raise the first amendment defense of free exercise of religion. Although the
United States Constitution guarantees the free exercise of religion and our
socio-legal system values parental autonomy, the state's interest in the safety of
its children outweighs the parents' personal rights when children's lives are
threatened. This argument makes sense.
142. See Note, supra note 105, at 814-15; see also Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla.
1989).
143. See, e.g., Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982).
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The inclusion of religious exemptions in child endangerment statutes, how-
ever, makes no sense. These exemptions conceivably serve two purposes: (1) to
further ensure the free exercise of religion and (2) to guard against arbitrary
intrusion upon the family by agents of the state. The United States Constitution
already guarantees both of these purposes, and the state itself controls the con-
duct of its child protection agencies. But the exemptions are not simply harm-
less surplusage in the law. They have created either expectations of immunity or
due process arguments for the defense or both. Moreover, courts have noted
that the exemptions cause unconstitutional entanglement of church and state.
The religious exemptions in child endangerment statutes should be abolished.
In addition to the proposal that our child endangerment statutes be rid of
exemptions for faith healers, this Note has suggested two alternative approaches
to the prosecution of parents whose children die as a result of religious prac-
tices: (1) prosecute for murder rather than for manslaughter, thus avoiding use
of the endangerment statutes to establish the unlawful act or legal duty; and (2)
reject the omission analysis, which requires that a legal duty be established, in
favor of a direct analysis of the causal connection between conduct and the
proscribed harm.
No form of prosecution, however effective, can prevent these tragedies. Af-
firmative action beyond abolishing religious exemptions or varying prosecution
strategies must be taken. Those who choose to place their children at risk,
through practices which are religiously motivated or otherwise, need to be iden-
tified so that their children can be protected from harm. Public awareness and
empowering communities to respond quickly must be priorities in the prevention
effort.
Judith Inglis Scheiderer
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